在过去的数十年中，我们的“理解未来模板”为预判未来经济发展提供了重要的指引——从去杠杆化所引发的金融危机，到为了应对经济疲软所作出的刺激性货币政策，再到“和谐的”去杠杆以及缓慢的经济扩张，尽管目前已经进入零利率时代，以及近15万亿美元的货币发行量。近期，我们看到，经济对适度紧缩的货币政策显现出了较强反应。当我们继续使用这个模板进行分析的时候，我们看到各种力量汇合在一次所产生的模式转变。

Overthe past decade, our “Template for Understanding What Is Going On” has been animportant frame of reference for making sense of things and anticipating whatis likely to come next—from the deleveraging that produced the financialcrisis, to the ensuing weak response to monetary stimulation, then thebeautiful deleveraging and the slowest expansion on record despite zero tonegative interest rates and $15 trillion of money printing, and most recentlythe heightened response to what was a moderate tightening of monetary policies.As we apply this template going forward, we see a confluence of forcesproducing what amounts to a paradigm shift.

在开始分析之前，回顾一下我们的模板，我们看到推动经济增长的四种力量：

1..生产率：这一因素是实际收入随时间增长的源泉，而非周期性的因素。

2.长期债务周期：指与收入相关的债务水平，它反映出信贷增长的潜力和经济对利率变化的反应能力。

3．短期债务周期：大多反映商业周期，通常由利率变化等因素驱动。

       4．政治：通常由人民和领导人作出选择。

Before getting into it, recall that through our template, we see four big forces driving economic growth:

• Productivity: the source of rising real incomes over time, but not of cycles.

• Long-term debt cycle: pertaining to the level of debts in relation to incomes, which reflects the potential for credit growth and the responsiveness of the economy to changes in interest rates.

• Short-term debt cycle: the business cycle, typically driven by the central bank through changes in interest rates.

• Politics: through the selection of leaders and the choices that they make.

上述因素在经济中相互作用，进而产生了经济和市场周期，这又使得与收入相关的信贷均衡、与效率相关的产出以及与风险溢价相关的资产定价产生波动。货币政策和财政政策是围绕上述均衡进而管理经济的杠杆。

The interaction of these forces produces cycles in the economy and markets, which oscillate around equilibriums pertaining to credit in relation to income, output in relation to capacity, and the pricing of assets in relation to acceptable risk premiums. Monetary policy and fiscal policy are the levers used to  manage economies around these equilibriums.

这些力量和对他们采取的政策使得一些条件达到了极限。我们投资的原则之一就是如何识别当前的模式，判断这一模式是否可持续，并分析其原因，设想当不可持续的模式停止运行时，这一模式会发生怎样的变化。回顾：

These forces and the policy responses to them have stretched a number of conditions to their limits. One of our investment principles is to identify the current paradigm, examine if and how it is unsustainable, and visualize how the paradigm shift will transpire when that which is unsustainable stops. Looking back:

1. 各国央行的货币政策已经走到了命运的尽头。他们首先将利率下降到零甚至是负利率，然后通过量化宽松来达到政策目的。但它的影响正在减弱。

2. 所有的政策都推高了股票和其他风险资产的价格，并且创造出高额的回报，但未来这些资产的预期回报率将会降低。市场上出现了一波股票回购、合并、收购、私募股权和风险资本投资的浪潮，他们的资金来源既有廉价的资金和信贷，同时也有金融体系内巨额的现金。

3. 这些政策加剧了收入和贫富差距的扩大，当前贫富差距已经达到20世纪30年代以来的最高水平。量化宽松政策使得持有资产的人比不持有资产的人收益更多，只有一小部分注入金融市场的资金最终进入了实体经济，并形成了相应的支出与收入。与此同时，与相对较低或者中等技能工人竞争者，包括了外包商和自动化设备，这些都压低了工资水平，从而有利于资本而非劳动力。此外，企业还受益于政策的放松以及减税等。

4. 这些改善企业经营环境的政策使得企业利润率飙升至历史最高水平，但同时引发了社会和政治上的反弹，越来越多的人们谈论反对企业、支持工人运动。而此前高速增长的利润率也不可持续，未来企业盈利能力有进一步下降的可能。

• Central banks have pushed monetary policy to the end of its useful life. They did this first by lowering interest rates until they hit zero, then by doing so much quantitative easing (i.e., printing money and buying financial assets) that its effects are diminishing.

• All this stimulus pushed up equities and other asset prices, producing great returns looking back, but it leaves future expected returns much lower. There has been a wave of stock buybacks, mergers, acquisitions, and private equity and venture capital investing that has been funded by both cheap money and credit as well as the enormous amount of cash that was pushed into the system.

• These policies contributed to widening wealth and income gaps, which are now at extremes not seen since the 1930s. QE disproportionately benefited those who held assets over those who didn’t, because only a fraction of the money injected into financial markets ultimately made its way into real economy spending and income. At the same time, outsourcing and automation competing with lowand middle-skill workers depressed wages, favoring capital over labor. Corporates also benefited from deregulatory policies and corporate tax cuts.

• This pro-corporate environment fueled a rapid expansion in corporate profit margins to historical highs—but it has also given rise to a social and political backlash, leading to increased talk of anti-corporate, pro-worker actions. It is unlikely that the past rate of profit margin growth will be sustained, and there is a good possibility that margins will shrink in the environment ahead.

当我们进入到一个新的模式的时候，我们将看到下列动态因素发挥作用：

1. 各国央行将难以进行刺激。各国央行已经认识到当前的不对称风险，促使其不再主动收紧货币政策以防止通货膨胀，或不再促使利率正常化。随着时间的推移，我们将看到利率或收益率曲线向着更加有管理的方向转变，类似于20世纪40初至50年代初美国，或者当前日本的做法（日本可能再次成为发达经济体将要走的一种发展模式）。

2. 新的货币政策模式将使得经济周期以一种前所未有的方式得以延续，这非常重要。虽然大多数经济周期的终结是源自于央行感知到通货膨胀的风险而收紧货币政策，但目前这一周期并不会为此而结束，或者说在遥远的将来，当通货膨胀压力超过政策目标的上限时才结束。尽管经济周期延长了，但仍然很弱  ，当下一次衰退来临之时，中央银行可能没有他们所需要的弹药。

3. 随着时间的推移，我们将看到所有地方都将会走向扩张性的财政政策。我们预计，政策制定者们需要转向我们此前所讨论的“货币政策3”这一概念，即从实质上协调货币政策与财政政策，直接以支持支出为目标，由央行将财政赤字货币化。这有可能来自于右翼（增加军费或降低税收），也可能来自左翼（通过增加基础设置投资或社会项目支出）。到目前为止，政策明显转向了更为宽松的财政政策，但是很少发挥作用。尽管政治障碍可能会在短期内放缓这一进程，但其轨迹似乎是清晰的。

4. 巨大的贫富差距将会导致持续的政治冲突和极端主义，这意味着将可能出现影响经济增长的政策出台。因此，我们预计，与我们熟知的“常规”商业周期驱动因素相比，政治结果和政治选择对市场的影响将会比过去要大很多。

5. 曾经使得企业/资本/财富受益的政策不会持续，它们很可能会出现逆转。极端变化的程度以及变化发生的速度是个政治问题，但在潜在不平等消除之前，要求这种变化的压力将会持续存在。

6. 在实际收益率处在低位，风险溢价受到挤压 的情况下，提振资产价格和产生所需要的回报的空间要小得多。换句话说，预期的资产回报率比我们现在要低的很多，这可能导致收入增长落后于债务和其他承诺（如养老金、补贴等）的增长，而上述承诺将会越来越多的到期。

As we enter a new paradigm, we see the following dynamics at work:

• Central banks will struggle to stimulate. Recognizing the asymmetric risks, central banks have already entered a new paradigm where they are no longer tightening proactively to prevent inflation or normalize interest rates. Over time, we expect to see a transition to more managed rates and yield-curve targeting, similar to what we saw in the US in the ’40s and early ’50s, or what Japan is doing today (with Japan once again exemplifying where the broader developed world may be headed).

• This is intended to sustain the expansion in an unprecedented way, and that is a big deal. While most cycles end because central banks tighten as they perceive inflation risks, this cycle will not be ended by central bank tightening, or at least it won’t until far into the future when inflationary pressures have exceeded the upper range of acceptable targets. And though the cycle is extended, it is weak, and when the next downturn comes, central banks will probably not have the ammunition they need.

• Over time, we’d expect to see a march toward expansionary fiscal policy nearly everywhere. We expect policy makers will need to shift to what we’ve been discussing for a long time—what we call “Monetary Policy 3”—which is essentially coordinated monetary and fiscal policy aimed directly at supporting spending, with central banks monetizing fiscal deficits. This is likely whether from the right (through higher military spending or lower taxes) or from the left (through more direct spending on infrastructure or social programs). So far, there has been a palpable shift in the policy conversation in favor of more fiscal easing, but much less action. While political obstacles may slow it down in the near term (in particular, the divided government in the US), the trajectory seems clear.

• The large wealth divide is likely to produce sustained political conflict and extremism, which implies the possibility of a wider range of policy options that can impact growth. So we expect political outcomes and policy choices to have larger impacts on markets and economies than we have seen in the past, compared to the “normal” business cycle drivers we are used to.

• Past policy shifts that benefited corporations/capital/the wealthy shouldn’t be extrapolated, and there is a good chance they will reverse. How extreme the changes are and how quickly they occur are political questions, but the pressures for such a shift are likely to continue to mount until the underlying disparities are addressed.

• With real yields at lows and risk premiums compressed, there is much less room to boost asset prices and generate required returns. In other words, expected asset returns are much lower than what we’ve experienced looking back, likely resulting in weaker income growth than is needed to service debt and other promises (pensions, entitlements, and so on) that will be increasingly coming due.

虽然我们已经确信这一新模式的关键因素，但是对于未来如何发展却无法预见。例如，左翼民粹主义（支持劳工）与右翼民粹主义（支持企业）所带来的结果并不相同，而这些都是通货紧缩压力下持续的政治分裂所产生的不同结果。对于我们来说，这一切都意味着我们应当以更加谦卑的态度来迎接下一个十年；不要以过去十年的环境来预估当下所走的路径，而是应当认识到现在各种可能的道路，并逐步采取措施来确保每条道路都会得到相应的结果。

While we believe these are the key characteristics of this emerging new paradigm, what we don’t know about how it will play out is greater than what we do know. For example, the outcomes of populism from the left (which tends to be pro-labor) are different from the outcomes of populism from the right (which tends to bepro-corporate), which are different from the outcomes of continued political division and stalemate in the face of ongoing deflationary pressures. To us, this all points to approaching the next decade with humility and caution: not extrapolating the environment of the last decade, recognizing the wide range of potential paths from here, and taking steps to ensure acceptable outcomes across all of them.

也就是说，过去的模式和我们将要进入的新模式，对于发达国家和西方世界的适用程度要远远大于东方。

That said, the past paradigm and the one we are entering apply much more to the developed world and the West than they do to the East.

随着中国经济的崛起和亚洲经济集团的合并，我们正处在一个三极世界当中，并由三种货币和信贷体系驱动：美元、欧元和人民币。这三种货币体系是全球经济的驱动力。目前，全球经济大致处于发达国家和新兴市场国家之间的均衡，全球产出的增长更多的来自新兴经济体而非发达国家。就货币体系而言，美国仍然是全球最大的经济体，美元仍然是世界主要储备货币，并在全球流通。欧元的货币和信贷状况推动者全球第二大经济体——欧洲的经济，欧元在全球的流通规模约是美元的四分之一。人民币依旧只在中国境内流通，但中国的货币政策是独立于美联储的。中国的国内信贷规模与美国相当，中国经济是整个亚洲经济的增长引擎。在过去3年里，中国对全球产出增长的贡献是美国和欧洲的两倍多。由于以中国为核心的亚洲新兴经济集团的出现，以及中国在2015年底将其货币和货币政策与美元脱钩，从而导致世界由两种货币体系扩张至三种货币体系。

With the rise of China and the coalescing of an Asia economic bloc, we are now in a tri-polar world, driven primarily by three monetary and credit systems: the US dollar, the euro, and the renminbi. These three monetary systems are the driving force of a global economy that is now roughly balanced between developed and emerging, with increases in global output now coming more from emerging economies than from developed ones. With respect to those monetary systems, the US is still the biggest global economy, the dollar is still the world’s primary reserve currency, and dollars circulate globally. Euro monetary and credit conditions drive the European economy, the world’s second largest, and euros circulate globally about one-quarter as much as dollars. The renminbi still only circulates within China, but China’s monetary policy is now independent of the Fed, China’s domestic credit market is as large as that of the US, and China’s economy is the engine of growth across emerging Asia, an increasingly independent and inwardly focused economic bloc that has an output comparable to the US plus Europe and that has contributed more than twice as much to the increase in global output over the past three years as the US plus Europe. The expansion from two dominant monetary systems to three occurred as a consequence of the size of the emerging Asia bloc with China at its core, and China delinking its currency and monetary policy from the US dollar in late 2015.

对于投资者而言，这种新出现的三极世界正在形成新的地缘政治风险。但这也将是一个巨大的机会，可以增加深层次的、基于基本面的多元化投资，而这一切正是源自于货币和信贷体系的流动性、风险溢价以及经济/市场周期的最终驱动因素。此外，从发达经济体和新兴经济体未来生产率的增长前景，以及它们在长期债务周期中所处的位置可以看出，二者在长期状况上有着天壤之别。

For investors, the emergence of this tri-polar world is creating new geopolitical risks. But it is also a tremendous opportunity to increase deep, fundamentally based investment diversification, because the monetary and credit system is the ultimate driver of liquidity, risk premiums, and economic/market cycles. In addition, secular conditions between developed and emerging economies could not be more different, as seen in their prospects for future productivity growth and where they stand in their long-term debt cycles.

因此，我们总结如下：

1. 我们正处于长期和短期债务周期的末尾，我们对于未来的判断很大程度上应当考虑我们是如何走到当前这一步的。

2. 鉴于相对较高的债务负担、已经很低的失业率以及较小的降息空间，保持经济高速增长的潜力是有限的，但长期的通货紧缩压力给了央行官员们充足的理由，让他们能够尽其所能保持经济扩张。

3. 货币政策对于经济刺激的有效性被大大减弱，这就需要我们所说的货币政策3（MP3），即中央银行协调与政府（财政）的行动，从而直接参与经济活动。

4. 新兴经济体，特别是亚洲的新兴经济体，在长期、短期债务中与发达国家和西方世界所处的位置不同，提高生产率的潜能较大，因此充满了独特的投资机遇与挑战。

5. 从根本上而言，环境和地理的多样化将是关键，新的阿尔法机会将从中央银行自身中发现。

With respect to how this plays out and what to do about it, we’d summarize it as follows. We then go into these topics more deeply.

• What we expect going forward is significantly impacted by how we got to where we are now, being at the tail end of the long-term and short-term debt cycles.

• The potential for above-potential growth is limited, given ongoing high debt burdens, already low unemployment, and little room to cut interest rates, but secular deflationary forces give central bankers the license to do all they can to keep the expansion going.

• The power of monetary policy to stimulate economies on its own is now substantially diminished, requiring what we refer to as Monetary Policy 3 (MP3), where the central bank engages directly in the economy by way of coordinated government and central bank actions. The economies of the emerging world, especially emerging Asia, are in a different stage of their long-term and short-term debt cycles and have greater potential for rising productivity, presenting unique and diversifying investment opportunities and challenges.

• Fundamentally based diversification to environments and to geographies will be key, and new alpha opportunities will arise from the box that central banks find themselves in.

纵观当前世界主要经济体，在大多数发达国家中，已经没有多少降息空间，债务/收入比也相对较高，所以货币政策1（利息相关的货币政策）的空间已将近耗尽。流动性已经被大规模的注入到资产当中，因此货币政策2（量化宽松）也没有太多空间。这使得货币政策3（协调政府与中央银行之间的行动）成为下一次刺激经济时的重要手段。中国是一个例外。由于中国的长期经济环境不同，除了拥有大量的货币政策3使用经验外，还可以继续使用货币政策1和货币政策2。考虑到政治体制不同，人民银行和中央政府之间能够定期协调政策。

Looking across major economies today, in most developed economies there isn’t much room left to cut interest rates and debts are very high relative to incomes, so MP1 is mostly spent. And liquidity has already been pushed into assets at a massive scale, so there isn’t much room left for MP2 either. This leaves MP3 as the remaining means of providing stimulus the next time material support is needed. China is the major economy that stands out as an exception to this dynamic. Because secular conditions in China are very different, China continues to have access to MP1 and MP2, in addition to having a significant amount of experience with MP3. Given their governance structure, the PBoC and the government already regularly coordinate policies.